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ABSTRACT 
This meta-communicative study provides an analysis of global interfaith dialogue as it 
pertains to peace and conflict, with a primary focus on Islam. The Islamic Republic of Iran and 
United States have a complicated history. Their diplomatic relationship is rife with manipulation, 
radicalism, and a disregard for human dignity. Currently, the US is imposing hundreds of 
sanctions and restrictions on Iran, from nuclear energy to medicine, as a result of President 
Trump’s decision to back out of the Iran Deal. However, other forms of dialogue are affecting 
positive relations between the two countries. Interfaith dialogue between North American 
Mennonites and Iranian Shia Muslims are mending the gaps in international diplomacy. As a 
result, this research provides a collection of scholarly opinions on interfaith dialogue as a tool for 
peacemaking in the context of Iran as an Islamic Republic. In doing so, this analysis includes an 
intimate focus on the perspectives of Shia Muslims in Iran regarding Western prejudice against 
Islam, Islamic conceptions of peace and pluralism, the intersection of religion and government, 
and their country’s relationship to the United States. The goal of this research is to argue the 
importance of religious literacy regarding relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and to 
support an avenue for further development in peacemaking between Iran and the US. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a sacred system of beliefs and practices, religion has the power to influence 
individuals’ and societies’ ways of thinking and acting. Political leaders have manipulated this 
power to promote and exacerbate conflict, particularly when different religious systems confront 
one another. The relationship between violence and religion, for Islam in particular, became a 
fundamental concern for scholars and politicians following the reprehensible attacks on the 
World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Following 
these heinous attacks, Islam has become the face of antagonism in the American socio-political 
climate, replacing the post-Cold War scapegoat of communism. That being said, the attacks on 
9/11 were by no means representative of Islam as a whole, in the same way that the Ku Klux 
Klan is not representative of Christianity. Nonetheless, American ideological representations of 
Islam have heavily misconstrued Western culture’s understanding of Islam, specifically as it 
pertains to peace and conflict. 
Islam is deeply involved in the social conceptions of both peace and conflict: Islamic 
texts address notions of peace, dictate when war is justified, and how conflicts are resolved in 
Islamic societies (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Muslim perspectives on peace, conflict, religious 
pluralism, and interfaith dialogue are all derivatives of peace as a holistic concept. An Islamic 
conception of peace is established through an understanding of the Qur’an, the Hadith (written 
accounts of the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings), and the Sunnah (the Prophet Mohammed’s 
deeds/doings) (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Through the compilation of these religious bodies, 
one can gain a preliminary understanding of what peace means within the scope of Islam. 
Today’s socio-political context in Western society (e.g. post 9/11 America, the election 
of President Donald Trump) has deterred individuals from understanding Muslim perspectives. 
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However, interfaith dialogue has become a powerful tool for both Muslims and non-Muslims in 
the United States and abroad. Religious pluralism and interfaith dialogue are vitally important to 
Muslims, especially for those living in countries where Islam is a religious minority (Hussain, 
2003). Politically speaking, the United States has had various unstable interactions with the 
minority Muslim populations within the country, in addition to orchestrating a multitude of 
manipulative actions with Muslim majority countries in the Middle East (including, but by no 
means limited to, the Islamic Republic of Iran).  
Since President Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran Nuclear Deal, the United States 
has re-imposed all sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, in addition to the inclusion of 
nearly 700 new entities, including banks, individuals, and vessels (Borak & Gaouette 2018). 
Current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declares that the US goal in implementing these 
increased sanctions is to “starve [the Iranian] regime” and “restore democracy” in Iran (Borak & 
Gaouette 2018). Critics however contend that in doing so the United States is dividing itself from 
European allies, gambling in the oil markets, deepening the humanitarian suffering of the Iranian 
people, and severely deterring Iranian moderates who are open to working with the US (Borak & 
Gaouette 2018). Although the US is attempting to put pressure on the Iranian government, it is 
the Iranian people who are truly suffering at the hands of American dominance and greed. 
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour, asserts that Trump and his 
supporters are projecting a “narrow minded definition of American nationalism which negates 
the interests of the rest of the world” and perpetuates US hegemony (O’Toole, 2018). The 
American nationalism and hegemony that Sajjadpour references is built on anti-immigrant and 
anti-Islam, exclusivist attitudes that are isolating Americans from one another and the rest of the 
world. 
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In an attempt to foster world peace and the dignity of human life for all Americans and 
Iranians, this research argues the following: A constructive way to facilitate and reestablish a 
positive relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran is for American scholars and government 
officials to engage in interfaith dialogue. An interfaith aspect to peace building is essential to an 
understanding of the Islamic Republic and must be examined through both Islamic and non-
Islamic lenses. Although the complicated history of distrust and manipulation underlie actions 
carried out by both countries, ownership must be taken for the detriment that past administrations 
have inflicted on the Iranian and American people. A meta-communicative analysis of interfaith 
dialogue, made possible by Mennonite Central Committee and the International Institute for 
Islamic Studies, also provides insight into the possibility of re-establishing and maintaining 
peace between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
In order to argue this point effectively, this research includes an analysis of the following: 
the socio-political portrayal of Iran and Islam as “other” in Western media; Islamic perspectives 
on peace, pluralism, and interfaith dialogue; the implementation of interfaith dialogue as a 
peacemaking tool and its intersection with politics; and lastly, a meta-communicative account of 
a 2018 interfaith learning tour in Iran. A theoretical framework is also provided to educate the 
reader on the importance of addressing diplomacy between the United States and Iran with 
religious literacy and cultural understanding, the role that the US government and media has 
played in demonizing Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the concepts of “othering” and 
Orientalism. Including all of these aspects begets an accurate, critical analysis of the 
intersections between religion and international diplomacy. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This research is analytically framed in the cultural studies approach to religious literacy. The 
cultural studies approach itself is based upon three assertions outlined by Religious Studies 
scholars: religions are internally diverse; religions evolve and change over time, and religious 
influences are embedded in all elements of culture (Moore 2015). When analyzing peace and 
interfaith dialogue from a Muslim perspective, one must recognize that there is no single Muslim 
perspective. The ideal type of the Muslim or Christian perspective recognizes that there is 
internal diversity and often conflict within any and all religious belief systems. Therefore, the 
ideal type of the Muslim perspective is based upon specific accounts of Muslim scholars and, for 
this particular research, places an emphasis on Twelver-Shiism in Iran. In addition to being 
internally diverse, religions also evolve and change over time. The rituals, symbols, and 
ideologies of Muslims and Christians today are not the same as they were 50 years ago or at the 
time of their inception. The history of peace and conflict between and within various religious 
systems change how religions are practiced and how they relate to one another. Lastly, religion 
influences all elements of culture. For example, the intersectionality of religion, politics, and 
culture are extremely relevant to Iran as an Islamic Republic. An understanding of the above 
three assertions of religious literacy then lay the foundation for the cultural studies approach.  
According to Moore (2015) there are four components to the cultural studies approach that 
allow for a critical, cross-cultural analysis based on religious literacy. First, the cultural studies 
approach is inherently interdisciplinary. Religious scholars recognize that cultural, political, 
economic, and religious lenses all coincide and act intrinsically upon one another (Moore 2015). 
Therefore, it is pertinent to offer not only a religious studies analysis, but also an analysis of 
culture, politics, history, economics, etc. One cannot understand Iranian politics or culture 
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without also understanding Shia Islam. Second, the cultural studies approach is conducted on the 
basis of religious “situatedness.” Situatedness refers to the assumption that all knowledge claims 
are situated within a particular socio-historical context (Moore, 2015). Knowledge claims made 
by current religious and/or political figures are framed within and stated as a result of the current 
socio-historical context. This notion of situatedness is applied to both religious claims and 
researched texts and source materials. As a result, what is considered relevant to global society, 
whether researched by scholars in the field, officially stated by a political leader, or simply 
discussed by the general public, is in fact situated. 
Third, within the cultural studies model there is a recognition and analysis of power 
dynamics. The issue of power vs. powerlessness involves not only the key players, but also key 
perspectives and ideologies (Moore, 2015). Consequently, when analyzing the context of 
interfaith dialogue in Iran as a Western researcher, there must be an examination of the unequal 
power relationship between the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, an 
emphasis on not only Western but also Islamic perspectives of dialogue, peace, and conflict 
resolution is necessary. The fourth and final component of the cultural studies model asserts that 
cultural norms are fluid and socially constructed. Religion exists as an unfixed type built on 
belief systems, which are constantly interpreted and reinterpreted by their believers. Just as 
gender, race, ethnicity, and socio-economic class are all elements of cultural interpretation, so 
too is religion (Moore, 2015). Culture and religion have a dialectical relationship. Therefore an 
understanding of religion as a situated, fluid, and culturally embedded phenomenon is imperative 
to understanding its role in society. 
 In addition to conducting this research through the lens of the cultural studies approach to 
religious literacy, there is also an underlying framework of social “othering” and the social 
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construction of the stranger. The way in which both societies and individuals address that which 
is unfamiliar or strange is relevant to today’s global society. With the consistent increase of 
globalization, the intersection of different religious, cultural, ethnic, and racial groups is 
inevitable. But how does one respond to these new global social dynamics and how does that 
response influence their social relationship? Academics, such as social theorist Georg Simmel, 
have studied these questions for centuries.  
In Simmel’s essay The Stranger (1908), he addresses the concept of social distance and 
how it affects our perception of the stranger. Simmel writes:   
“There is a kind of "strangeness" that rejects the very commonness based on something 
more general which embraces the parties. The relation of the Greeks to the Barbarians is 
perhaps typical here, as are all cases in which it is precisely general attributes, felt to be 
specifically and purely human, that are disallowed to the other. But "stranger," here, has 
no positive meaning; the relation to him is a non-relation; he is not what is relevant here, 
a member of the group itself. As a group member, rather, he is near and far at the same 
time, as is characteristic of relations founded only on generally human commonness. But 
between nearness and distance, there arises a specific tension when the consciousness 
that only the quite general is common, stresses that which is not common. In the case of 
the person who is a stranger to the country, the city, the race, etc., however, this non-
common element is once more nothing individual, but merely the strangeness of origin, 
which is or could be common to many strangers. For this reason, strangers are not really 
conceived as individuals, but as strangers of a particular type…” 
 
Simmel (1908) argues that physical distance also creates social distance, or a perceived barrier 
that deters us and brings us further away from mutual social interaction. When relating to that 
which is far or unfamiliar, such as a “stranger to the country,” the stranger is not conceived of as 
an individual, but rather a foreigner: a stranger “of a particular type” (Simmel, 1908). Simmel 
(1908) states that “stranger” in this context “has no positive meaning.” When encountering a 
stranger of this type a sense of tension develops, due to the fact that the social relationship is 
purely founded on “general human commonness.” Interactions, such as this, highlight to the 
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observer that which is un-common or different, creating social distance between the actors. 
When being human is the only perceived commonality, people often become consumed by 
(visible) differences in race, ethnicity, religion, etc. Therefore social distance, as it relates to the 
foreigner, strips the stranger of their individuality and socially marks them as ‘other.’  
 Simmel (1908) references the relationship between the Greeks and Barbarians as example 
of the stranger as a foreigner; however, the same can be said for Americans and Iranians and/or 
Christians and Muslims. The religious landscape of the United States is increasingly changing. 
Although originally established by and primarily populated with Protestant Christians, the US is 
currently home to 3.45 million Muslims, a figure that has been steadily increasing over the past 
decade (Mohamed, 2018). The introduction of an unfamiliar religion has caused many Christians 
to respond to the increase in Muslim individuals as strange, other, and (to some) threatening. The 
same cannot necessarily be said for Americans and Iranians as social groups. Current limitations 
on travel, such as visa denials and the infamous Muslim Ban, are currently keeping most 
Americans and Iranians both physically and socially distant. The beliefs about the other are 
therefore dominated by outside interest groups who control society’s acquisition of knowledge. 
These interest groups, often media/news outlets and official government stances, assert their 
knowledge claims about the other without ever being checked or challenged. As a result, social 
groups like Iranians and Muslims fall into Simmel’s category of the stranger, or a foreign other.  
 One of the West’s most recurring images of the stranger/other is the Orient. Edward Said 
(1978) coined the term Orientalism to refer to the particular lens through which the West views 
and interacts with the Eastern World, or the Orient. Said (1978) considers the Near Orient as “the 
lands of the Arab Near East, where Islam was supposed to define teal and racial characteristics.” 
The Near Orient essentially includes parts of Northern Africa as well as the span of Turkey, 
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across the Arabian Peninsula and the Old Persian Empire (commonly referred to in the Western 
World as the Middle East), to India. Orientalism is Western domination and influence over the 
Orient (Said, 1978), typically stemming from underlying ethnocentric attitudes. The power 
dynamic between the Islamic Republic of Iran and United States also reflects this complex 
hegemony. Said (1978) argues that, “from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end 
of World War II, France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; [however, since 
then] America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did (Said, 
1978). This tradition of Western ethnocentric dominance has played into the collective 
consciousness of Americans. Not only does Orientalism create a fantasy of the generalized 
inferior “other,” but also plays a role in constructing the Western self as “superior.” Harkening 
back to Simmel’s work, the dichotomy of civilization (the Greeks) vs. barbarism (the Barbarians) 
also comes into play. For example, the West has appointed itself as the civilized, savior of 
democracy for the world (despite its clear political and social flaws). As a result the West has 
justified colonizing and taking advantage of the Orient through a distorted self-actualizing lens 
of false superiority. Orientalism has played an influential role in the US relationship to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. The US has taken advantage of Iran and the Iranian people politically, 
socially, and economically. Iran and Islam are considered part of the Orient and therefore an 
‘other’ in eyes of the United States. 
 The concepts of Orientalism and ‘othering’ involve the binary labeling of us versus them. 
Our primitive neural systems deal in binaries as a means of survival: for example, denoting the 
concepts of good vs. bad and pain vs. pleasure (Dozier, 2002). From an evolutionary perspective, 
developing us-them divisions is a natural biological process that emerges from basic survival and 
therefore is not inherently problematic. However, all us-them separations have the potential to 
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develop into hate or anger during times of stress and conflict (Dozier, 2002). This is because us-
them differentiation, although a helpful tool for primitive survival, can develop in-group/out-
group stereotyping when examined in modern, global society. Those that are not considered “us” 
or the in-group, are inevitably considered “other.” Those of the in-group do not concern 
themselves with the consternations (or at most times even the existence) of the other; they are 
often viewed with indifference and at times vague hostility (Dozier, 2002). Even indifference is 
rife with a lack of empathy that, when tested by conflict, can lead to destructive stereotyping 
tendencies.  
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METHODOLOGY 
After receiving IRB approval from Kutztown University of Pennsylvania on April 3rd 
2018, I traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran to act as a participant observer for an interfaith 
tour organized by the Hikmat International Institute for Oriental Wisdom and Spiritualty. In 
addition to acting as a participant observer in group interviews and interfaith exchanges, I also 
interviewed additional subjects for the purpose of this study. In total the sample consisted of 15 
individuals (13 male and 2 female). Although the sample size is small, nearly all of the 
individuals formally interviewed were heavily involved in interfaith dialogue practices as both 
scholars and participants for years. Unfortunately the sample only consists of two females, 
primarily due to the fact that Muslim women are not permitted to high ranking religious 
positions, such as sheiks or ayatollahs. Additionally, most established Iranian religious scholars 
are men (although according to the president of the University of Religions and Denominations, 
currently more than fifty percent of overall Iranian university admissions are women), and the 
individuals who organized the interviews for this Iranian learning tour were also all men. The 
women interviewed (one a Muslim Iranian and the other a Christian American) were both 
married to men who are either currently or were previously employed at interfaith dialogue 
centers. That being said, the comments of a number of everyday Iranian women, who were not 
officially interviewed, are also included in this research study.   
Group interviews were pre-established by the Hikmat Institute and applied to half of the 
interview subjects. These meetings were conducted in universities and other institutes, and lasted 
for several hours. Many of the group interviews took place over coffee and snacks or lunch. The 
majority (9/14) of interview participants were Iranian Shia Muslims, including very high-ranking 
religious scholars (e.g. asheik and an ayatollah). Iranian subjects primarily consisted of 
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professors, university presidents, and religious scholars/clergy. Representatives of a few minority 
religious groups in Iran were also interviewed. All interviews taking place in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran were carried out April 7-22, 2018. Due to travel constraints, some interviews 
involved follow-up email interviews after meeting and developing prior contact with the 
participant. This was the case for five Iranian professors/religious scholars. In some cases, email 
communication continued from April-September 2018. The remaining two (out of the fourteen) 
interview subjects were American Christians who have participated extensively in interfaith 
dialogue in Muslim majority regions. Interviews with American subjects were conducted in the 
US between August-September 2018. These interviews were audio recorded and took place over 
lunch or coffee, lasting approximately one hour each. During participant observation and one-on-
one interviews conducted in Iran, data was recorded via handwritten notes. Interaction with local 
Iranian participants was subject to chance opportunities, as they arose. Such interactions with 
local Iranian participants took place in public spaces, such as coffee shops, hotel lobbies and 
cultural/religious tourist sites. 
Individuals were not required to sign an informed consent form, due to the fact that many 
participants in the Islamic Republic of Iran may feel suspicious of signing their names to an 
official paper. Iranians may be reluctant to put their names to a document offered by an 
American, even in the friendliest of situations. For this reason, informed consent was obtained 
orally by means of communication with the researcher. As the researcher, I stated my position as 
an undergraduate student, my research goals, and the purpose of the interview. Participants were 
told that the purpose of the study was to collect and publish data on interfaith activity in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. The respondents then had the ability to decide whether they wished to 
participate in the study, and could opt out of the interview at any point. 
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Mennonite Engagement & Obtaining Access  
Although the United States has had complicated and often negative relations with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, this political relationship does not preclude other forms of connection 
between the two countries. The Mennonite community in North America, (in this particular case) 
headed by the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), has established a religious and aid-based 
connection with the country of Iran and its citizens. Following the 1990 Manjil-Rudbar 
earthquake in northern Iran, MCC set out to establish connections with Iran through the Iranian 
Red Crescent Society (IRCS) (Martin, 2014). Since then, MCC and IRCS have participated in 
regular interfaith dialogue conferences, student exchanges, and cultural tours. Through this 
extremely unique relationship, Mennonites (primary based in Pennsylvania, USA and Ontario, 
Canada) have been able to foster global interfaith dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
gain insight into both inter- and intra-state aspects of interfaith dialogue. 
Mennonite socio-religious history emerged out of a context of peace, power, and 
community. As evident in the Anabaptist tradition, Mennonite spirituality focuses heavily on 
peaceful nonresistance as discussed in the Gospel. As faithful followers of Jesus, Mennonites 
recognize peacemaking efforts and the eradication of injustice as fundamentally important and 
extremely spiritual acts (Theissen, 2013). Additionally, the historical context of Mennonite 
persecution has shaped the Mennonite worldview as it relates to the notions of power and 
community. The extreme persecution that Mennonites faced in Europe has fortified a clear 
dualism between church and state for many North American Mennonites (Theissen, 2013). In 
addition to persecution as an example of power relations, these contextual elements also 
influenced Mennonite spirituality to promote a distinct sense of community.  
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Initially, the central focus of Mennonite peacemaking was the refusal to participate in 
war, specifically the US military draft in World War II (Thiessen, 2013). Leading into the mid-
late 20th century, organizations such as Mennonite Central Committee continued to expand their 
peace building efforts and global aid development. Mennonite conflict scholars have developed 
peacebuilding practices that extend beyond picking up the pieces in the aftermath of conflict, to 
addressing the root causes of conflict in tandem with supplying provisional aid and development 
assistance (Theissen, 2013). This ideology toward peacebuilding practices is implemented by 
MCC and many other Mennonite affiliated organizations.  
The following research study could not have been conducted without the pre-established 
relationship between North American Mennonites and Iranian Shia Muslims. As the researcher, I 
was able to participate in the Iranian religious and cultural tour through my association with 
James Street Mennonite Church and Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness. Lancaster Interchurch 
Peace Witness is a grassroots association dedicated to promoting justice, environmental 
protection, and peaceful solutions to conflict. As a member of James Street Mennonite Church 
(located in Lancaster City, PA), I had access to participation in the Middle East Interest Group of 
the Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness association. Ed Martin, a member of the Middle East 
Interest Group, former Eastern Mennonite University professor and director for the Center for 
Interfaith Engagement, and former MCC director for Central & South East Asia organized the 
tour from the North American side. Martin has lead three similar tours and visited the Islamic 
Republic of Iran roughly 15 times. That being said, Martin attributes the success of the Iranian 
learning tours to the status of the International Institute for Islamic Studies (IIIS) in Iran and its 
director, Dr. Mohammad Ali Shomali.  
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RESULTS 
Historical Context 
Conflicts do not occur in a vacuum. There are always underlying factors in relation to the 
context of the conflict that fuel feelings of blame, distrust, animosity, fear, hatred, and/or 
ethnocentrism. Knowing the context enables peacemakers to not only predict the behaviors and 
direction of the conflict, but also prevents them from applying unsuitable solutions that could 
potentially exacerbate the conflict (Abdullah et al., 2016). In order to better understand how to 
move forward in terms of diplomacy and peace between the US and Iran, there must first be a 
critical analysis of the contextual factors most relevant to today’s socio-political context. 
Peacemaking models recognize history, culture, religion, and media (among others) as contextual 
factors that influence and shape the nature of conflict (Abdullah et al., 2016). The contextual 
history of the relationship between Iran and the United States is arguably the strongest element 
deterring both nations from moving forward together, peacefully [See Figure 1.1 in the Appendix 
for a timeline of important conflict events in the history between the US and Iran].  
When Americans examine their historic animosity toward Iran they typically fixate on the 
embassy hostage crisis of 1979. On the other hand, Iranians trace their negative attitudes further 
back to 1953, and the CIA and British Intelligence orchestrated overthrow of the democratically 
elected Prime Minister of Iran, Muhammad Mossedegh. Mossedegh had socialist leanings and 
plans to nationalize Iranian oil. Western Cold War politics and interests in the exploitation of 
Middle Eastern oil sources lead the US to join Great Britain’s plans for a military coup. In July 
1953 Western forces put those plans into effect and by August the Pahlavi Shah, Mohammad 
Reza, whom the US regarded as their prime Iranian ally, was reinstated as the nation’s leader 
(Axworthy, 2016). The overthrow of Mossedegh is rarely discussed in an American context,  
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because many Americans have no knowledge of the event and government sentiment still 
supports American intervention in Middle Eastern affairs. Ed Martin recalls discussing the 
Mossedegh incident following an ecumenical delegation in 2007. During the delegation Martin 
met with senators in Washington, which included James Jeffrey, who at the time was the 
“number two person” in the Middle East Bureau. According to Jeffery, the overthrow of 
Mossadegh was the “best thing” the US did for Iran.  
Although US responsibility for the coup is not quite so straight forward, the CIA played 
an indisputable role in suppressing democracy in Iran after the coup (Axworthy, 2016). Most 
notably, the CIA was instrumental in forming the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, which 
oppressed Iranian freedom for the following quarter century (Axworthy, 2016). The Shah was 
extremely disliked by the Iranian public for his cruelty and consolidation of wealth and power. 
As the Shah’s power began to deteriorate and the senior Islamic clergy rose in opposition, 
including the Ayatollah Khomeini, the US continued to support the Shah. The culminating event 
of these conflicting forces was the Shah’s decision to flee to the United States for medical 
treatment in January 1979, and President Jimmy Carter allowing him to seek refuge there. It was 
then that the Ayatollah Khomeini was welcomed back to Iran and the Islamic Revolution came 
to fruition. During this time many Iranians, whether members of the government or general 
public, believed that American leaders were conspiring ways to consolidate power and reinstate 
the Shah in Iran; a fear that, considering Iran’s history with the United States and the fact that 
Western re-imposition of the Shah had previously occurred, is quite rational. However, the 
Islamic Republic’s response to this Western threat resulted in the single most detrimental event 
in Iran’s relationship to the United States, at least from an American perspective.  
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The hostage crisis of 1979 was a direct result of the United States receiving the Shah for 
asylum and medical treatment. At this point, Khomeini had appointed a Provisional Government 
On November 4th a group of university student radicals occupied the US embassy building in 
Tehran and detained the diplomatic staff, demanding that the “criminal, deposed Shah” be 
returned to Iran (Axworthy, 2016). Images of hostages, handcuffed and blindfolded, flooded 
American media. Within Iran, the embassy takeover ignited an atmosphere of radicalism and 
calamity that renewed a sense of revolutionary fervor; Khomenei issued a statement on 
November 5th praising the students’ act as a “second revolution” and insinuating that the 
embassy take over had a layer of espionage, which was helped by the release of documents 
obtained in the US embassy linking his more liberal opponents to contacts with the US 
(Axworthy, 2016). It was not until January 1981, as the new US president Ronald Reagan 
finished his inaugural address, that Khomeini’s government officially released the embassy 
hostages. By releasing the hostages at this moment, Khomeini reiterated the purely political 
stance he took in this crisis. For Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran, putting politics 
above the ethical treatment of human beings had immeasurable consequences. The hostage 
situation has colored the view of Iran so badly that it has become the overarching radical image 
of Iran and Shiism for nearly every American politician, not to mention the general American 
public.  
Although the overthrow of Mossedegh and the US hostage crisis were not in any way the 
only contextual factors in the conflict relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
United States, they are extremely salient and reflective of the way that Iranians and Americans 
related to one another’s shared past. The political differences between the United States and Iran 
have (at least in the case of North America) been cast as differences in culture and religion. 
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Specifically, the political-economic sources of tensions are shrouded by claims of fundamental 
difference (i.e. Iranians are violent Muslims living in a backward culture). The US paints itself as 
a righteous, civilized society by casting Iranians as barbarian ‘others, harkening back to 
Simmel’s (1908) work. As a result, the US involvement in Iran and its negative impact (e.g. the 
overthrow of Mossadegh, the support of the Pahlavi Shahs, economic sanctions, etc.) are 
conveniently left out of the conversation. The obligation is put on both governments to 
acknowledge and take ownership for past mistakes, and to honestly seek forgiveness and peace 
rather than vindictively holding on to the damage that has already been done. When attitudes that 
are dictated by Cold-War politics and ethnocentric biases still prevail in American politics it is 
nearly impossible to move forward. Additionally, allowing Iranian politics to dictate the ethical 
treatment of civilians is unacceptable for peaceful reconciliation. These damages made by past 
administrations are reflected in the socio-historical context of the conflict, which includes the 
influences of religion, politics, and the media.  
 
Iran & Islam as ‘Other’ 
Western Media Framing 
Regardless of increasing globalization and developments in technology, the vast majority 
of people around the world do not travel internationally (Saleem, 2007). For this reason, media 
and news outlets play an essential role in shaping the public’s impression of other countries and 
ethnic groups. The United States has a history of portraying foreign countries and people through 
a skewed lens: exaggerating or marginalizing certain issues, providing selective information, and 
exaggerating enemy nation’s power to garner support from policy makers and the general public; 
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US coverage of the 1991 Gulf War, 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, and 2003 invasion of Iraq are 
just a few examples of this trend (Saleem, 2007).  
The Islamic Republic of Iran is no exception to US foreign country image-framing. 
Framing is used to communicate certain aspects of a perceived reality more saliently than others, 
in order to evoke and advance a particular interpretation  (Entman, 1993; Saleem, 2007). Despite 
the reality that Western people do not possess much reliable information on the Islamic Republic 
or the Iranian people, striking images of angry men in turbans and crowds with burning flags 
often come to Americans’ minds. Western media reporting repeatedly stresses elements of 
Iranian culture as abnormal, irrational, and dangerously problematic (Axworthy, 2013). By 
framing Iran in such an unnatural light and reporting heavily on items of protest and anomie, the 
US has managed to establish a particular image-frame through which the American public 
conceptualizes Iran.   
In their book on US press coverage of Iran between 1951-1978, Dorman & Fahrang 
(1987) found that American media sources built images of Iran based on different eras of US 
foreign policy interests, in the hope of shaping public sentiment in the government’s favor. 
During the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, Iran was a strategic ally to the US, despite the Shah’s 
implicit consolidation of wealth and the countless human rights violations he carried out against 
the Iranian people. By 1978 Iran became America’s largest non-NATO recipient of economic aid 
and weapons. Additionally, Iran was home to more than forty thousand working US military and 
civilian personnel (Dorman & Fahrang, 1987). However, this relationship changed drastically 
once the Shah could no longer serve as a puppet for US interest in the Middle East and the 
Islamic Revolution came to fruition. Policy makers and the press asserted that Khamenei’s 
government represented fanatic Islamic fundamentalism and exported terrorism (Saleem, 2007). 
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This sentiment continued into the 21st century, as the United States became increasingly and 
irresponsibly involved in Middle Eastern affairs. During his State of the Union Address in 2002, 
President George W. Bush declared Iran a member of the “Axis of Evil,” along with Iraq and 
North Korea. Bush and his administration used the metonymic phrase “Axis of Evil” to evoke 
images of Nazism, fascism, and satanic forces (Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007). The image 
shaping of the Iranian nation as the antithesis to world peace interests therefore runs along the 
lines of skewed US political self-interest.  
Not only has the US framed the image of Iran as a foreign nation, but also the host of a 
foreign religion. Anti-Muslim sentiment and scapegoating has been the overwhelming theme in 
Western media since the end of the Cold War (Saleem, 2007). For the United States in particular, 
it was the Iranian Revolution that galvanized anti-Muslim sentiment. Mughees-uddin (1995) 
asserts that the “Islamic Character” projected by Western media portrays Islam as a threat to 
American peace and security, and Iran the pinnacle of terrorist Islamic fundamentalism. 
Furthermore, Mughees-uddin (1995) argues that the US media has purposefully attempted to 
evoke conflict and misunderstanding between Christians and Muslims by framing Christianity as 
a religion of tolerance and free market economics, and Islam as an impediment to social 
freedom. The ideology of Islam and Iran as a direct adversary to American values is also evident 
in US media coverage of the hostage crisis in 1979. Although the incident was extremely 
damaging for the US, it was Shia Islam rather than the actions or inactions carried out by the 
Iranian government that was targeted as the true enemy. During coverage of the hostage crisis, 
ABC commenter Frank Reynolds made comments to affirm that Iranian Muslims are fueled by 
hatred. Over a crowd of Iranians chanting, “God is great,” Reynolds contended that the real 
meaning was “Hatred of America” (Saleem, 2007). When political rhetoric turns to attacking and 
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generalizing an entire religion, it entirely reframes the conversation and widens the gap of 
mistrust and misrepresentation.  
 
Iranian Perspectives  
The US media projection of Iran as a country full of radical Islamic militants is very 
clearly visible to the Iranian people as well. Ordinary Iranians even joke with the few American 
tourists they come across asking if they have “met any terrorists yet.” The son-in-law and 
representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani argues that American media sources associate 
Iran and Islam with terrorist groups such as ISIS. Notwithstanding, one of the biggest frustrations 
or fears Iranian’s have with the US representation of their country is framing Iran and its citizens 
as backwards (Erdbrink & Fanning, 2018). The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister asserts that 
America’s hegemonic media distorts the image of Iran and projects the country as socially, 
politically, and religiously “abnormal” (Erdbrink & Fanning, 2018). He continues that the 
relationship of distrust and suspicion between Iran and the West has only been exacerbated by 
this misrepresentation.  
Over the past year there have been a number of demonstrations in Iran and the reality of 
their manifestation has not been clearly reported by mainstream Western sources. Iranians 
understand that these demonstrations represent a lot of the tension that is brewing within their 
society and the severe pressure that the Iranian government is currently under. Nevertheless, 
many of the Iranians who were interviewed indicated that these protests have been highly 
exaggerated by the US media, and have a heavier focus on the economy than social issues. 
Iranian religious scholars who were interviewed are quoted saying:  “Due to the very unfair US 
sanctions against [our country], there has been more economic pressure on the lower classes in 
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Iran and this led to some demonstrations;” “The protests began as primarily economic and they 
were supported by many conservatives loyal to the system.” What began as economic also turned 
to a protest of ongoing social issues, namely that of women and the compulsory hijab. 
Furthermore, when it comes to the issue of freedom of speech in a religious state such as Iran, 
the lines of social, political, and economic protest tend to blur together.  
That being said, Iranians recognize the need for governmental transparency. This 
includes both the transparency of the Iranian government to listen and respond to demonstrations 
in an ethical manor and for the US to cover and report on such global demonstrations ethically as 
well. Sheikh Morteza Rezazadeh proclaims, “I personally hope that the whole world including 
my own country will be more tolerant and provide higher freedom of speech and other types of 
freedom for people. In my opinion the current situation is not ideal in any country including the 
United States and Iran. But according to the law, people are free to talk and criticize the 
authorities and men of power as long as it is not a hate speech or is not insulting. Being 
committed to this law by the governmental officials and all other people is something that I 
believe needs a lot of improvements.” Regardless of the fact that the governments of both the 
United States and Islamic Republic of Iran should improve their transparency, that does not 
justify the violation of human rights. 
Because the Islamic Republic has been the target of ethnic and religious discrimination 
by the United States, Iranian religious leaders have called upon Muslim youth in Western nations 
to separate political bias from an understanding of religious truth. In his message to the youth of 
North America and Europe following the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Ayatollah Khamenei 
(2015) addressed how the West has manipulated the image of Islam and questions Western 
incentives to cast Islam as a threat:  
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“Many attempts have been made over the past two decades, almost since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, to place [Islam] in the seat of a horrifying enemy… 
Why is it that attempts are made to prevent public awareness regarding an important issue 
such as the treatment of Islamic culture and thought? You know well that humiliation and 
spreading hatred and illusionary fear of the ‘other’ have been the common base of all 
those oppressive profiteers… Why does the power structure in the world want Islamic 
thought to be marginalized and remain latent? What concepts and values in Islam disturb 
the programs of super powers and what interest are safeguarded in the shadow of 
distorting the image of Islam?” 
 
Khamenei (2015) attempts to rectify this negative image shaping by requesting two actions of 
young Western Muslims: first, to research the incentives behind the derogatory framing of Islam; 
and second, to gain direct knowledge of Islam through primary and original sources.  
 At the core of the shift in ties between the US and Iran, as well as the following four 
decades of antithetical socio-political encounters, is a lack of understanding and subsequent 
misrepresentation of Islamic culture, tradition, values, and ideology by Western powers (Saleem, 
2007). If one does not take active participation in considering the perspective of the other it is 
nearly impossible to make amends. Current and past Western rhetoric on Shia Islam has clearly 
damaged the relationship between the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore it is 
impossible to forgo Islamic perspectives moving forward, if an actively favorable relationship 
for both nations is achievable.   
 
Peace, Pluralism, & Interfaith Activity in Islam 
Despite the widespread narrative of Islam and Muslim communities as inherently violent, 
scholarly works and cross-cultural historical analyses provide evidence to the contrary (Abu-
Nimer, 2013; Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Said & Funk, 2001). An accurate representation of 
Islam and its relationship to peace and conflict calls for insight from Muslim scholars who cite 
Islamic texts and socio-historical Muslim tradition. Therefore the following details scholarly 
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analyses of Islamic peace and conflict, religious pluralism, and interfaith dialogue. The 
discussion of these topics also involves a basic understanding of terms and concepts central to 
Islamic thought, such as jihad, ummah, tawhid, and ahl al-kitab among others. Not only is it 
erroneous to proclaim Islam as inherently violent or non-violent without examining these topics, 
but also if ethical and effective interfaith activity is to take place a basic understanding of peace, 
pluralism, and interfaith dialogue from Islamic perspectives must be acknowledged. 
 
Peace & Conflict  
Misconceptions about the meaning of jihad and forced conversion have lead Westerners 
to condemn Islam as militant. The term jihad, often translated as “holy war,” actually means, 
“struggle.” In truth the phrase “holy war” originated with Christian Crusaders, who used it for 
their own theological legitimacy for violence (Aslan, 2011). On the other hand, the “struggle” 
that the Qur’an most often refers to is an inward struggle of the soul. There is both a greater and 
a lesser jihad. The greater jihad religiously connotes the struggle for holiness, submission to 
God, and an overcoming of sin; lesser jihad refers to “any exertion – military or otherwise – 
against oppression and tyranny” (Aslan, 2011). Although the Qur’an does allow for war under 
stringent conditions, such as fighting for justice with an emphasis and understanding for human 
life, the preference is for nonviolence and sabr (patience) (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). The 
Qur’an also forbids forced conversion stating, “There is no compulsion in religion: the Truth 
stands clear from the Wrong” (2:256). This viewpoint is also evident in the Sunnah of the 
Prophet. In 630 Muhammad returned to Mecca as the conquering ruler, along with his followers, 
after years of migration and persecution. Amir Hussein (2003) provides a description of the 
historic account: 
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“[Muhammad] literally had the power of life and death over those who years earlier had  
tormented and persecuted him and had killed several of his followers… In the most  
triumphant of earthly moments, Muhammad chose to display the utmost mercy, and  
declared total amnesty. In this extraordinary act, he came to those who had persecuted  
him, and recited to them the words from the Qur’an that Joseph had first spoken to his  
brothers when they came to him in Egypt, humbled after having sold him earlier into  
slavery: ‘This day let no reproach be upon you. May God forgive you, and God is the  
most merciful of those who show mercy’ (12:92). There would be no forced conversion  
or slaughter of the Meccans.”  
 
Not only have misinterpretations of Islamic concepts, such as jihad, been used to 
perpetrate the image of Islam as a religion of violence, but also have been used against Muslims 
by extremists who have risen to power as a result of Western influence and/or been supported 
financially by Western powers. At times Islamic militants have manipulated the definition of 
lesser jihad to promote social and political agendas, as apposed to true religious interests (Aslan, 
2001). Despite the current narrative of fear and irrationalism, Americans and Europeans are not 
the primary targets of terrorism. In another letter from Khamenei (2015) to youth in Western 
countries he says, “The Muslim world has been victim to terrorism and violence more 
extensively, on a much larger scale, and for a much longer time [than Western nations.]” 
Additionally, the primary groups perpetrating terrorism (e.g. ISIS, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda) 
have all at one point been either financially supported by the US or have risen to power partially 
as a result of power vacuums created by US invasions and subsequent inadequate withdrawals 
from Middle Eastern countries. Khamenei (2015) continues on this point arguing:  
“Military campaigns targeting the Muslim world over recent years, which have taken  
countless lives, are [an] example of the West’s contradictory logic… I consider the  
imposition of the Western culture on other nations and belittling independent cultures as  
a silent and very harmful act of violence. Humiliating rich cultures and insulting their  
most respected parts are happening while the alternative culture is by no means qualified  
to supplant them.”   
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Statistics Global Terrorist Index compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) 
support Ayatollah Khamenei’s claims. In 2015 the top ten countries affected by terrorism were 
all located in either the Middle East, Africa, or Asia; Furthermore, over 72% of terrorist related 
deaths occurred in just five of those countries (Dudley, 2016). The GTI defines terrorism as “the 
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (Institute for 
Economics and Peace, 2014). This is contrary to the common narrative of Western media, which 
labels such violence as “terrorism” only when perpetrated by individuals of Middle Eastern 
decent or those who affiliate themselves with Islam. That being said, it is not only important to 
understand the reality of Islam’s misconstrued image, but also to familiarize oneself with true 
Islamic conceptions of peace and conflict. In doing so one can develop a more realistic image of 
Islam and attempt to eradicate religious prejudice.   
In addition to examples from the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, Shia Muslims in 
particular typify the acts and deeds of Imam Ali, including his conceptions of war and peace. 
According to Khamenei (2009), Imam Ali, “the lover of peace and security,” participated in acts 
of war but strived for peacemaking whenever possible. Islamic theology does not necessarily 
adhere to the ideology of pacifism, but instead upholds justice and the defense of freedom and 
human rights. Accordingly, there are justifications for war under Islamic law, and evidence of 
such in the Qu’ran, Hadith, and across Islamic history. Imam Ali sought out negotiation and 
attempted to avoid bloodshed whenever possible, so that he might not act against the Prophet 
Muhammad’s religion: Imam Ali said, “I will not begin fighting in a war unless I first ask the 
enemy to arrive at an understanding… If they change their mind and repent, I will accept, and if 
war is their only choice, I will ask for help from God and then fight them;” On another occasion 
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Imam Ali said, “I analyzed the pros and cons of [fighting Mu’awiyah (the fifth Islamic/Sunni 
Caliphate)] and I could not go to sleep anymore. Thus I saw no other choice but to fight him or 
to deny Islam. As a cure I found war easier than the torture of giving it up, and I found death in 
this world lighter than death in the other world” (Khamenei, 2009). In Imam Ali’s view, 
engaging in war as a means of justice is staying true to Islam, as long as all contrary measures 
are taken to avoid conflict. The choice posed by Imam Ali in Khamanei’s view is to deny the 
righteousness that can be brought on by justice, or to deny Islam. 
The term ummah, or religious community, is also essential to the understanding of 
Islamic peace and peacemaking. Islamic thought developed from a tradition of communalism 
and an emphasis on the greater good. In Muslim societies the common good comes before that of 
the individual and as a result, individuals have an obligation toward the community (Kadayifci-
Orellana, 2009). The notion of ummah, as a manifestation of divine living bound by human 
collectivist interest, calls forth individuals to protect one another from harm. Therefore, conflict 
is viewed as detrimental to both divine and communal harmony (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). 
Furthermore, ummah is not exclusive to Muslims and Muslim communities. In verse 10:19 the 
Qur’an states, “And [know that] all mankind were once but one single community, and only later 
did they begin to hold divergent views. And had it not been for a decree – that had already gone 
forth from thy Sustainer, all their differences would indeed have been settled [from outset].” The 
Qur’an also says, “And indeed within every community **have We raised up** an apostle 
[entrusted with this message]: ‘Worship God and shun the powers of evil!’ And among those 
[past generations] were people whom God graced with His guidance…” (16:36). These verses 
not only present humanity as a derivative of a single religious community, but also recognize that 
the expanse of that single religious community is present throughout various societies and across 
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generations; all religious communities are therefore considered an ummah (Shafiq & Abu-Nimer, 
2007). 
 
Pluralism & Interfaith Dialogue 
As with any new religious tradition, Islam began as a minority and could not have 
developed without the presence of interfaith dialogue (Hussain, 2003). Before the famous 
emigration of Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D., there was a 
lesser-known emigration to Abyssinia. This migration story is an example of religious pluralism 
in early Islam and the cooperation of Christian and Muslim societies:  
“As people began to accept Islam they met opposition from others in Mecca. This 
opposition turned to physical persecution against certain members of the early Muslim  
community. Muhammad gathered a group of those most vulnerable, and instructed them 
to go across the Red Sea to Abyssinia, a Christian country ruled by a Christian king. 
There, the emigrants were welcomed and accepted. Indeed, the Christian king protected 
the Muslims against demands and extradition by the polytheists of Mecca. The emigrants 
stayed in Abyssinia until they rejoined the larger Muslim community in Medina” 
(Hussein, 2003).  
 
The Sunnah or life of the Prophet Muhammad is considered exemplary for all Muslims (Hussein, 
2003). Accordingly, accounts of interfaith interactions in Islamic history are fundamental to the 
conceptualization of pluralism across time.  
Islamic perspectives on religious pluralism can also be established through an 
understanding of Islamic universalism. One of the core principles of Islam is the notion of 
tawhid, meaning the oneness of Allah or the “Principle of Unity of God and all being” 
(Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Said & Funk, 2001). Islamic monotheism is central to the shahada, 
meaning testimony or declaration of faith. Shahada refers to the basic statement, “There is no 
god but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger,” which includes the declaration of tawhid (e.g. 
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(There is no god but Allah”). Therefore tawhid is not just Islamic doctrine, but also an affective 
center to Islam and a discursive act that Muslims take on wholeheartedly. Tawhid as a 
fundamental grounding for Islamic thought inevitably shapes Islamic conceptions of peace, 
harmony, and universality. Not only does the concept of tawhid dictate one’s personal 
relationship to God, but also the relations and harmony of all God’s creation; The belief that 
everything emanates from God establishes the foundation for Islamic universalism to include all 
fellow human beings, regardless of the socially constructed identities they hold, such as race, 
nationality, or gender (Said & Funk, 2001; Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009).  
To acquire a holistic perspective of what religious pluralism means and is, one must also 
understand what pluralism is not. In his book on Muslim and Christian dialogue, Amir Hussain 
(2006) details two key themes of religious pluralism. First, pluralism does not mean diversity; 
Individuals of differing faiths may live in the same area, but if there is no interaction or 
engagement between them then there is no pluralism. Second, the goal of pluralism and interfaith 
dialogue is not tolerance, but understanding. Tolerance is in this sense is nothing but 
indifference. Genuine pluralism is based on shared knowledge and coexistence. The Qur’anic 
term ta’arafu can be translated as knowing, understanding, or building relations (Shafiq & Abu-
Nimer, 2007). Ergo, ta’arafu is the cornerstone of Islamic pluralism and interfaith dialogue. 
Without a commitment to knowledge and open interaction there is no room for productive 
growth and interaction between various religious groups. Islamic texts call on both Muslims and 
non-Muslims to recognize their differences and learn from them.  
 Muslims are constantly reminded of their relationship to ahl al-Kitab or People of the 
Book, commonly referring to Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. People of the Book are those 
who received an earlier revelation from God, and the Qur’an recognizes a peaceful coexistence 
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between Muslims and those with a shared heritage and common God (Hussein, 2006): “And 
argue not with the People of the Book unless it be in [a way] that is better, except with such of 
them as do wrong; and say: ‘We believe in that which has been revealed to us and revealed to 
you; our God and your God is One, and to God do we surrender” (29:46). The Qur’an promotes 
such sharing with the People of the Book in the hope that it will result in peaceful exchanges and 
mutual understanding (Shafiq & Abu-Nimer, 2007). Another verse from the Qur’an details the 
righteousness of ahl al-Kitab: “Some of the People of the Book are a wholesome nation. They 
recite God’s signs in the watches of the night, prostrating themselves, having faith in God and 
the last day, bidding honor and forbidding dishonor, vying with one another in good deeds. They 
are among the wholesome. Whatever good they do, they will not be denied its reward” (3:113-
115). Not only are Muslims reminded of their common relationship with People of the Book, but 
also that these honorable and righteous non-Muslims will be rewarded for their faithfulness.  
 These basic concepts of Islamic peace should still be framed within the cultural studies 
approach to religious literacy. All religious have a variety of beliefs that reflect the clashes and 
schisms that come with internal diversity. The above ideals of peace are not accepted or 
understood to the same degree by every Muslim. As previously stated, some may accept the ideal 
type and others may reject it completely. The degree to which Muslims accept and understand 
these concepts vary considerably, which can be said for every religion and denomination 
worldwide. For example, many North American Mennonites consider themselves pacifists, 
however not all Christians adhere to pacifism. Although an understanding of the basic Islamic 
conceptions of peace and pluralism are extremely important, it is equally important to recognize 
that individuals who practice Islam will not all adhere to these ideal beliefs.  
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Interfaith Dialogue in Iran 
When it comes to peace, conflict, and interfaith dialogue, Ayatollah Alavi Boroujerdi 
argues that people of faith have an obligation to each other and humankind to come together and 
denounce violence. Particularly during the current societal movements toward materialism, 
Ayatollah Boroujerdi states that interfaith dialogue is of utmost importance. He continues, saying 
the common point of all divine religions is that people are responsible for every action they take 
in this world. Many of the wars and conflict around the world are carried out in the name of 
religion. As a result of the violation of human ethical values emphasized in religion, millions are 
suffering. Consequently, people of faith have a responsibility to reflect on the causes for war and 
suffering in the world, and to determine what to do about them. Ayatollah Boroujerdi questions 
people of faith asking, “Why are we still seeing so many violations [against people] when we 
have thousands of mosques, synagogues, and churches?” At the same time, Ayatollah Boroujerdi 
affirms that, “we should not limit ourselves to condemnation, but come together to find a 
practical solution.” Therefore the goal that Ayatollah Boroujerdi poses is to make connections 
between people and spread such ethical and moral values to all societies.  
In addition to actively seeking connection between individuals of different faith 
traditions, Iranian religious scholars often cite Qur’anic verses and Shia theology as their 
framework for engaging in interfaith dialogue from an Islamic perspective. Verse 49:13 in the 
Qur’an declares: “Oh humanity! Truly We created you from male and female, and made you into 
nations and tribes that you might know one another. Truly, the most honored/noble of you in the 
sight of God is the most God-conscious/righteous of you. Indeed, God is Knowing and 
Acquainted.” Amir Hussain (2003) details four notable points in this verse that reflect the 
Qur’anic view of pluralism and interfaith dialogue. First, the verse is addressed to all of 
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humanity, not exclusively Muslims. Second, the creation and separation of people into different 
nations is positively valued and purposefully comes from God. Third, the verse calls upon 
humanity to transcend those differences in order to learn from one another, thus characteristic of 
ta’arafu and Islamic pluralism. Last, the verse says that the best people are not necessarily 
Muslim, but those who are righteous and know of God. Numerous Iranians, Islamic scholars, and 
everyday Muslims (Hussein, 2006; Idliby, Oliver, & Warner, 2007; Shafiq & Abu-Nimer, 2007) 
cite this particular Qur’anic verse as a cornerstone to Islamic perceptions of interfaith dialogue. 
Morteza, a sheikh living in Qom who was interview for this study, notes that Islamic 
mysticism plays a significant role in his conceptualization and engagement in interfaith 
activities: “I find mysticism and spirituality a common language among all the religious.” 
Islamic mysticism or Sufism is characterized by a sense of esoteric spirituality that can be 
incorporated into Sunni and Shia interpretations, in addition to standing on its own. Sufism, 
although practiced across the globe, is often associated with Iran and Shia Islam. For example, 
Sufism greatly influenced Iranian literature and Shi’a philosophy (Pierce, 2008). Iran was also 
the first region that Islam expanded to outside of the Arabian Peninsula. According to Hussein 
(2003) it was the Sufis, or Islamic mystics, who can be credited with spreading Islam throughout 
the Sasanian Empire of Persia; By living among the people and embracing an ideology of 
worshiping God for God’s sake, Sufis provided a lasting example of how to live a Muslim 
lifestyle. Even Ayatollah Khomeini adopted the philosophy of Islamic mysticism, writing Sufi 
poetry about his longing to leave the classrooms of rigid Islamic study and go to the wine cellars 
to drink the wine of God’s love. That being said, Morteza continues the explanation of his 
interfaith beliefs:  
“Islam as a branch of Abrahamic religions and a major religion with many theological, 
historical, ethical, jurisprudential and mystical teachings has a lot in common with other 
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major faith traditions and this has made a great ground to open the discussion. What is 
important for me is to always try to manifest a very logical, moderate, ethical and 
peaceful account of Islam, as I firmly believe that that is the reality of all the divine 
religions including Islam. I think that the extremist and exclusivist approaches are 
deviations that have happened in all the religions and it is upon all of us to try to express 
our objection with those approaches and promote the true religion of God, which is based 
on peace and leads to peace.” 
 
For many individuals the basis of interfaith dialogue is finding common elements among 
different religions. Dr. Amir Akrami contends that Islam and Christianity are not that different: 
“Even if there are differences, we are still humans with the same commonalities and challenges.” 
According to Dr. Muhammad Legenhausen (2016), a religious scholar and Shia Muslim convert 
currently living in Iran, this is known as reductive pluralism. Although an important foundation 
or steppingstone for those engaging in interfaith dialogue, reductive pluralism focuses on basic 
similarities rather than a true understanding and appreciation for various religious traditions. 
Legenhausen asserts that his interpretation of an Islamic perspective on interfaith dialogue “is 
based on the idea that we need to respect our differences rather than trying to eliminate them. 
Although I believe that Islam demands a commitment to its own superiority to other religions… 
It is more important to further understanding than to convince others or to argue about relative 
merits. I call this approach ‘non-reductive pluralism’.” Non-reductive pluralism highlights and 
appreciates religious differences by recognizing them as unique divine qualities through which 
God guides people (Legenhausen, 2016). Consequently, non-reductive pluralism provides an 
honest and open environment for dialogue in a way that respects and values other religious 
traditions.  
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Intersection of Interfaith Dialogue & Politics 
The process of interfaith dialogue between the Islamic Republic of Iran and United States 
is complicated by the fact that the intersection of religion and politics plays vastly different roles 
in the two countries. In the US, religion is supposed to have little to nothing to do with the 
political sphere, though its informal presence is indisputable. However, the Iranian political and 
religious systems are one in the same. As a result, Iranian religious leaders have much more 
political power in their country than religious leaders do in the United States. Participants in the 
dialogue process are then in distinct positions: Americans have little influence on politics in their 
own country, whereas Iranian participants can have a direct impact. This complication sheds 
light on the delicate intersection between religion and politics on a global scale, in addition to the 
significance of its function in the dialogue process. 
Iranians also participate in interfaith dialogue on a governmental level. Dr. Amir Akrami 
worked as the Director for the Center for Interreligious Dialogue in Iran under President 
Mohammad Khatami. Khatami’s presidency was characterized by open and active promotion of 
dialogue among civilizations. Roughly 80% of the dialogue conducted by the Center at this time 
was with Christian representatives from the Vatican, Church of England, Greek and Russian 
Orthodoxy, and World Council of Churches (WCC). During meetings the groups would examine 
the history of their relationship and decide a topic for their next discussion. Examples of 
discussion topics include ethics, law, the role of women, and interpretations of religious texts. 
Dr. Akrami noted that some challenges to this kind of dialogue involved a degree of mistrust that 
Iranians often feel toward foreigners (particularly Westerners) coming into their country, in 
addition to some internal dialogue issues due to the variety of political and ideological 
differences among Iranian Muslims themselves.  
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The openness toward interfaith dialogue exhibited by Khatami’s government did not 
necessarily continue into the mid to late 2000’s. The activity of the Center for Interreligious 
Dialogue decreased dramatically and some of the positive progress made was reversed during the 
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose government was characterized by insularity. 
Nevertheless, the Center is currently in operation under Hassan Rouhani’s presidency. The 
United States also has a governmental organization for political interreligious dialogue 
introduced under the Obama administration. In 2013, Secretary John Kerry established the Office 
of Religion and Global Affairs as a sector of the US State Department (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2016). According to Ed Martin, government officials like John Kerry and Douglas 
Johnson recognize religion as the gap in American diplomacy. However, since the inauguration 
of Donald Trump, who some Iranians would consider the “[American] Ahmadinejad,” US global 
interfaith dialogue has also been scaled back. 
Due to lack of governmental action, many Americans and Iranians may be skeptical of 
the ability to produce practical political outcomes via interfaith dialogue. One Iranian scholar 
who was interviewed, reasons:  
“I think it is a mistake to think that interfaith dialogue can make a significant contribution  
to peace between nations, because peace depends on the decisions of politicians and not 
on the good will of those who engage in interfaith dialogue. This is not to deny, however, 
that on occasion good relations fostered by interfaith dialogue can promote lobbying 
efforts for peace, and sometimes can change a few people's minds so that they are more 
skeptical about accusations made against members of other nations and faiths in the 
media… [but] I certainly am under no illusion that learning tours and interfaith dialogues 
are going to convince people like Trump that sanctions against Iran should be lifted.” 
 
In truth, small-scale interfaith activities are not guaranteed to make real, macro political change. 
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that diplomacy between the US and Iran cannot be reestablished 
without a religious component. Spiritual belief systems dictate a majority of political action in 
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Iran as an Islamic Republic. Therefore, a faith aspect is necessary in establishing a foundation for 
structural change between the two nations.  
Furthermore, many other Iranians, including the Deputy Foreign Minister (Dr. 
Sajjadpour), believe in the positive effects of small-scale interfaith activities. When asked how 
interfaith dialogue can promote peace between Iran and the US, Iranians scholars are quoted 
saying, “I think we are living it. When there are good enough people on both sides change can 
happen. The change might be small, but it is worthwhile;” and “A major solution to the problem 
is making people talk to each other. You cannot expect change in one day.” Specifically, Dr. 
Akrami argues that change in social/cross-cultural perceptions (such as the reduction of 
prejudice) that result from engagement in interfaith activities, whether at an individual or small 
group level, have a larger and more practical impact than one might believe:  
“Unfortunately, a lot of good ideas, such as interfaith dialogue, stay at the level of talk 
and do not translate into action. A lot of this has to do with politics, but at the same time 
all of us should bear more responsibility to be more serious about our values and good 
ideas. I do think that we need to foster a culture of good relationship and dialogue 
between our intellectuals, ordinary people, athletes, artists, historians and so on to remove 
a lot of misunderstandings, misperceptions and prejudices that exist between our 
countries and cultures. Ignorance is the root cause of many problems and interfaith and 
intercultural dialogue can be the best remedy here.” 
 
Although interfaith dialogue on this level (e.g. dialogue conferences, learning tours, student 
exchanges) may not directly result in the US government lifting sanctions against Iran, dialogue 
creates a space for learning that can reduce prejudice and encourage those involved to advocate 
for practical change. 
Political sub-theories of change by means of interfaith dialogue recognize the opportunity 
for the cooperation of both political and religious leaders to lead to relational and structural 
change. Relational change reflects an alteration in attitudes of religious followers toward and in 
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relation to the ‘other;’ when political leaders implement the message of relational change 
engendered by religious leaders, it can lead to structural change (Neufeldt, 2011). Shia religious 
leaders in Iran are extremely influential in both the public and private spheres. When Iranian 
religious leaders publically endorse a particular religious or political message, they can catalyze 
relational and structural change. According to Neufelt (2011), when politicians give religious 
leaders a platform to voice religious concerns within the public sphere, religious followers are 
less likely to engage in violence motivated behavior. Likewise, research shows that individual 
participation in interfaith groups is an effective catalyst for political participation. A 2017 study 
(Todd, Boeh, Houston‐Kolnik, & Suffrin) on the political action of individuals from 25 interfaith 
groups across 35 US states found that participation in an interfaith group where individuals share 
community information and events predicted an increase in political action. As a result, research 
studies and theories of change support that the incorporation of religion in the political sphere 
can lead to positive political change.   
 
Iran as an Islamic Republic 
Coming from a country built on the foundation of religious freedom, it can be difficult for 
Americans to rationalize and comprehend the synthesis of a religious state, or implementing 
interfaith dialogue for means of political peacemaking. “Much of the rest of the world accepts 
the idea that government must be secular and religion must be private,” states an Iranian scholar. 
Many Americans view Iran purely as a theocracy rather than a democracy. However, the general 
public either directly or indirectly elects all Iranian political leaders. Sheikh Rezazadeh argues 
that Iran is just as much of a democracy as the US, primarily due to America’s Electoral College 
model. On the other hand, he does admit that a weak point in the Islamic Republic’s democratic 
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system is the heavy vetting of presidential and parliamentary candidates by religious leaders.  
Although incorporating politics with religion can be problematic, many of the moral and ethical 
values based in religious tradition support equality and an appreciation for human life. Ayatollah 
Boroujerdi advocates for people to incorporate ethical and moral values into politics by 
encouraging them to endorse political candidates who do not violate people’s rights.  
When it comes to global conflict, Ayatollah Boroujerdi proclaims that people are not 
typically the cause, instead it is governments working for their own self-interests. Many Iranians, 
including the Deputy Foreign minister, recognize the division between government leaders and 
the general populace: “You cannot equate people with their leaders. Take Stalin or Hitler for 
example;” “The people are not the same as the government. Government is like chess. [The 
leaders are the players and we are just the pieces].” Iranian scholars attempt to further explain 
this separation between 'the government’ and ‘the people.’ 
 
“There are positions of power in Iran which are not directly elected by the people, such as 
the supreme leader, the head of judiciary and the members of the Guardian Council, as 
opposed to positions that are directly elected such as the president or members of the 
parliament. The separation that people talk about refers to this distinction. Many people 
generally feel that the former is not responsive to their needs and demands while they 
have a lot of power in their hands and the president, or more generally the executive, do 
not have enough power to implement their programs that are approved by the people 
through elections.” 
 
“Iranians are often critical of their elected leaders, who are collectively known as "the  
government" (doulat), even though they are generally loyal to the system of Islamic 
governance (nezam). Those who are against the entire system are a small minority, which 
is over-represented among Iranian expatriates living in Europe and North America. Those 
who are against the system usually do not care much about which government is in power 
(e.g. liberals or conservatives). Criticism of the president or his government by Iranians is 
often misunderstood by Westerners for criticism of the system.”    
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Despite the previously discussed issues with freedom of speech in Iran, even religious 
scholars are able to be critical of their government and the challenges of having a religious state. 
Another Iranian scholar recounts:  
“Of course there are challenges [to an Islamic state]… [One] challenge is that since the 
system in Iran is religious, mistakes made by Iranian governments are taken to reflect 
badly on Shi'i Islam. Shi'i religious leaders in other countries (e.g. Iraq, India, etc.) might 
feel slighted because of the dominance of the Iranian religious leadership…” 
 
The perception that mistakes made by the Iranian government reflect poorly on Shia Islam, is 
also reminiscent of the Islamic Republic’s relationship to Ayatollah Khomeini. The Islamic 
Revolution was built on the theory of Imam Khomeini, a political-religious theory that was not 
necessarily accepted by all scholars. As a result, criticism of the Islamic Republic can not only 
appear as a criticism of Shia Islam, but also criticism of Imam Khomeini, who is revered by 
many as the rescuer of the Iranian people from the Shah and manipulative Western powers.  
As devout Muslims who also participate in interfaith activities, many Iranian Shia 
scholars see the disadvantages of living in an Islamic Republic for those from a minority 
religious group. Dr. Akrami recalls feeling “caught in the middle” during his work at the Center 
for Interreligious Dialogue: “Having a religious government has its challenges. On the one hand 
I want the country to prosper and flourish, and attend to Muslim values. But on the other hand I 
want to be positive of people of other faiths… The golden rule is to put yourself in others shoes.” 
Other religious scholars discuss the treatment of religious minorities in the Islamic Republic: 
“I do think that the religious state in Iran, despite its advantages, has failed to bring about 
a just and prosperous society that we think Islam and the revolution seek to establish. The 
main reason is that a religious state normally requires giving dominance to a specific 
interpretation of the religion [Twelver Shiism] and, therefore, other interpretations [e.g. 
Sunnis, other Shiite sects, etc.) are deprived of being treated on an equal footing, let alone 
those who do not follow the official religion [e.g. Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, etc.], 
hence it leads to an unjust society where human rights are violated.” 
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“There are parts of the government, the reformers and moderates in particular, who wish 
to treat the religious minorities in a just and fair manner but, unfortunately, there are 
those who, for ideological reasons, think that Islam and Shiism must be given precedence 
or priority over the adherents of other religions, hence they treat them as second-ranking 
citizens. Ordinary people in general have historically treated them in a very fair and 
humane fashion and do think of people of other faiths as equally Iranians with the same 
rights and responsibilities.” 
 
The faith traditions of the People of the Book are recognized in the 1979 Iranian Constitution and 
the law forbids any violation of the rights for followers to practice those religions freely. For that 
reason there is a certain ‘live and let live’ attitude when it comes to the treatment of minority 
religious groups in Iran. For example, although the consumption of alcohol is illegal in the 
Islamic Republic, some groups, such as the Armenian Christians, are permitted to have wine in 
their homes and for religious ceremonies. The government tends to turn a blind eye to such 
behavior, a fact that many Iranians know and some take advantage of.  
Governmentally, religious minorities have their own representation in the Iranian 
parliament. There are two seats reserved for Armenian Christians, one for the Assyrian 
Christians, one for the Jewish community, and one seat for the Zoroastrian community (Pierce, 
2008). In truth the representation of minority seats in parliament is actually greater than the 
percentage of minorities in Iranian society. Furthermore, the Iranian government recognizes 
religious minorities’ legal jurisdiction over their own communities in domestic matters (such as 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance law) (Pierce, 2008). That being said, certain positions in the 
Iranian government (mostly those of higher ranks) require individuals to be Muslim. 
Despite some laws and other protections for minority religious groups in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, most minorities face a number of challenges and institutionalized 
discrimination. Religious minorities are not allowed to propagate or missionize their religions. 
 43 
For up to ten years after the Islamic Revolution, the Bible could not be published in Iran. 
Currently, Muslims are also forbidden to convert from Islam. A Zoroastrian carpet salesmen says 
that he does not like to tell others about his religious identity because he is afraid the government 
will take his money away. Additionally, since its inception in the late nineteenth century, the 
Baha’i religious group has been heavily discriminated against and persecuted in Iran. The Baha’i 
were considered heretics by the ulema, heresy or shirk in this sense being the most serious sin in 
Islam. In August 1980 all nine members of the Baha’i National Spiritual Assembly of Iran were 
arrested and never seen again (Axworthy, 2013). The Baha’i faith is not even studied at the 
University of Religions and Denominations in Qom, because the Islamic Republic does not 
recognize the Baha’i religion.  
In a religious state it is nearly inevitable that a particular religion or religious 
denomination will have preferential treatment. That being said, individuals from some minority 
religious groups in Iran assert that the country has always been their home and they are content 
with the freedoms they have. The Jewish community can trace its lineage in Iran back to the 
Babylonian exile. A Jewish representative from a synagogue in Tehran claims that there are no 
real challenges for the Jewish community in Iran: “We have our lives, shops, freedom to 
worship, everything.” If needed the Iranian government also provides services and protection to 
minority religious communities, in addition to allocating funds for the upkeep of Jewish 
synagogues and Christian churches (Pierce, 2008). Morteza, a Shia Muslim recounts:  
“I personally heard from several members of the minority groups, especially Christians 
and Jews, that many people treat them much kinder when they realize that they belong to 
the minority groups. A Jewish person told me that every time that he goes to a 
governmental office, he gets a better reception if he tells them that he is Jewish! This is 
because in the Iranian popular culture, treating the minorities and also the guests with 
kindness and respect is very important.” 
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This tradition of kindness and hospitality that Morteza refers to is truly exemplified by the 
Iranian people. Despite the fears that Westerners may have of Iran, Americans who have traveled 
to the country speak very highly of how they were welcomed with open arms by everyday 
Iranians (Shellenberger, 2013). That said, the dichotomy of the government vs. the people 
consequently infiltrates daily social interaction, in addition to the spheres of economics, politics, 
and religion.  
 
Implementation of Interfaith Dialogue & Peacemaking 
Open engagement is a mode of peacemaking that refuses to permit division and illusory 
powers to define whom one’s enemies are (Huebner, 2016). In the case of the United States and 
Iran, past administrations have determined the enemy status that has nearly irradiated any 
diplomacy between the two countries. When it comes to development and peacebuilding 
strategies, governmental self-interest is often at odds with the needs and well-being of local 
populations (Theissen, 2013). That being said, current interfaith engagement outside of the 
political realm has reopened avenues for positive relations between the US and Iran. Iranian 
religious scholars engaging in interfaith work contend that, “[Interfaith dialogue can promote 
peace between the US and Iran by] making more opportunities for encountering and dialoging on 
our common crisis with mutual respect and balanced rights.” This sense of mutual respect 
requires a synthesis of Western and Islamic interfaith dialogue practices. It is insufficient to 
apply dialogue practices that maintain the status quo, or to simply impose western models 
without acknowledging their limitations, particularly in a multi-cultural setting (Abdullah, Akay, 
Hassanzadeh & Tabari, 2016). The following provides an analysis of an Islamic model for 
dialogic peacemaking practices and values, as well as a cross-cultural example of interfaith 
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activity by Christian Americans in a Muslim majority region.  
 
Islamic Studies Model for Conflict Analysis - C.R. SIPPABIO 
Western conflict resolution techniques are implemented with implicit cultural 
assumptions, including an emphasis on individualism, materialism, and cost-benefit analyses 
(Abu-Nimer, 2013). Furthermore, these Western models often assume the core problem is in 
communication, an analysis that discounts deeply rooted structural conflicts and the asymmetric 
power structures at play (Abu-Nimer, 2013). For this reason it is unproductive to implement a 
solely Western dialogue model in this cross-cultural context. Nevertheless, faculty and students 
at the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) in Virginia illustrated a 
framework for conflict analysis that provides an avenue for peacemaking from an Islamic 
perspective [see Appendix Figure 2.1]. This model, referred to as C.R. SIPPABIO (Context, 
Relationship, Sources, Interests, Positions, Parties, Attitudes/Feelings, Behavior, Intervention 
and Outcome/Stage), was developed to ease the analysis of the different stages of conflict 
resolution (Abdullah et al., 2016).  The most important elements of this conflict analysis 
framework are conflict elements, contextual factors, and the relationship between the parties 
involved (Abdullah et al., 2016). The contextual factors were previously discussed in the 
beginning of this research. That said, the conflict elements and relationship between the US and 
Iran must be further broken down and examined in order to fully understand the applications, 
values, and limitations of the C.R. SIPPABIO model.  
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Conflict Elements 
 According to the C.R.SIPPABIO model there are eight essential elements of conflict: 
sources, interests, positions, parties, attitudes, behavior, intervention, and outcome (Abdullah et 
al., 2016). These conflict elements and the means of addressing them are rooted in Islamic 
perspectives of conflict intervention. In order to illustrate the conflict elements most central to 
the case of the United States and Iran, there will be an examination of conflict interests, parties 
and intervention, in addition to how each are enacted and conceptualized from an Islamic 
perspective. 
 The dimensions of interests from an Islamic perspective relate to the duality of 
preventing harm and causing good. In keeping with Abdullah, et al. (2016), “any interest 
preventing good or causing harm to the individual or society, whether it is in this life or in the 
hereafter” is not considered a real goal in an Islamic value system. The dualism of preventing 
harm while also causing good therefore involves Islamic ideals of collectivism and is not limited 
to this lifetime. In believing in the accountability of the Day of Judgment, the reward or 
punishment of God in the hereafter, Muslims struggle to be just and fair in their relationships and 
goals in conflict resolution (Abdullah et al., 2016). Goals in the dualistic model can be positive 
or negative: positive goals are aimed toward attaining a desired future outcome, while negative 
goals involve the avoidance of an unwanted future state (Abdullah et al., 2016). Arguably the 
United States has a positive goal of attaining control and security over the Iranian economy, in 
doing so maintaining the safety of the American public and American governmental interests. On 
the other hand, Iran has a negative goal of avoiding economic depression and Western 
dominance. The interests of the parties in conflict are consequential in reaching a point of 
negotiation and determining the role of the parties involved. 
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From an Islamic perspective, the role of parties is embedded in the notion of ummah 
rather than the Western emphasis on autonomy. In the Quran, God commands Muslims to single 
out individuals within the ummah to act as representatives to fulfill the interests of the greater 
good: “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoying what is 
right, and forbidding what is wrong; they are the ones to attain felicity; Ye are the best of 
peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoying what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in 
Allah” (3:104; 3:110). Not only does God command Muslims to choose those of good nature 
among them as leaders, but also extolls those leaders for the goodness they enact for the 
community. The members of the ummah and the leaders representing them are both considered 
parties in a conflict scenario. Parties as another conflict element refer to the individuals, groups, 
communities or nations participating in a conflict. Parties can be divided into three levels 
(primary, secondary, and tertiary) in terms of their relation to and distance from a particular 
conflict. Primary parties are those who have a direct vested interest in the conflict (e.g. American 
and Iranian governmental leaders); secondary parties are those who are indirectly vested in or 
affect by the conflict (e.g. the American and Iranian general public); Tertiary parties are distant 
from the conflict but still have a degree of vested interest (e.g. European Union, United Nations) 
(Abdullah et al., 2016). Tertiary parties often act as mediators when the primary parties have 
reached a stalemate in negotiation. That said, the role of parties is crucial to conflict resolution 
and deciding whether third party intervention is necessary. 
When it comes to negotiating conflict intervention observations and themes from Islamic 
sources emphasize a preference for parties to make their own settlements. The following ayah 
from the Quran addresses this outcome superiority in conflict resolution: “If they arrange an 
amicable settlement between themselves; and such a settlement is best; even though men’s souls 
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are swayed by greed. But if you do good and practice self-restraint, Allah is well-acquainted with 
all that ye do” (4:128). The ethics of conflict intervention or mediation relate specifically to 
relationships and balances of power. Neutrality is of utmost importance in conflict mediation, 
however the involvement of a third party brings questions of ethics to light: Is empowering a 
weaker party as a mediator being neutral? Can one truly be neutral if there is an imbalance of 
power? (Abdullah et al., 2016). These questions are central to the discussion of intervention, 
parties, and goals and must be examined in depth if third party negotiation is needed in a conflict 
scenario.  
 
Relationship 
There are three components that contribute to the examination of relationship in the C.R. 
SIPPABIO model: power, pattern, and bond (Abdullah et al., 2016). Both the C.R. SIPPABIO 
model and the cultural studies model to religious literacy call for an analysis of the power 
dynamics involved in social conflict.  There are various types of power, and in the case of the 
United States and Iran the US has clear resource and procedural power. The following are 
definitions of these powers according to Abdullah et al. (2016): Resource power: The power 
derived from being in control over resources; Procedural power: The power that one enjoys 
from being in charge of decision-making procedures. Currently, the US has numerous sanctions 
in place that deny Iranian’s access to resources (from nuclear power to medication) and have 
significantly damaged the Iranian economy over the past five to ten years. Furthermore, US 
procedural power originates from the Western ethnocentric ideals attached to orientalism. The 
United States has used its influence in the global sphere to manipulate Middle Eastern resources 
and encourage other nations to do the same. The power imbalance between the US and Iran must 
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be addressed and reexamined if legitimate conflict resolution and peacemaking practices are to 
ensue.  
In addition to power, relationship in conflict analysis also involves pattern. Participating 
parties often resort to and repeat certain patterns of behavior during conflict situations (Abdullah 
et al., 2016). From an Iranian perspective, one of the patterns that the US government historically 
adheres to is the constant implementation of sanctions and other restrictions that reinforce the 
unjust US domination over the Middle East. Dr. Ed Martin contents that the one of the true 
sources of historic animosity, from an American perspective, is Iran’s insistence on being 
independent. When Khomeini came into Iran as a rising leader he made it clear to the Iranian 
people that their nation was to be independent; Iran was not going to be part of the Soviet block 
or in an alliance of NATO. Martin claims that the Iranian insistence on sovereignty and self-
determination was difficult for the United States to accept, considering the influence the US 
government had over Iran when the Shah was in place. On the other hand, a pattern that has been 
exhibited by the Iranian government is the nation’s reluctance and at times complete disregard 
for the regulations (namely nuclear) imposed by the United States and United Nations. These 
conflict behaviors coincide to create a pattern where the US continues to restrict Iranian behavior 
when it interferences with American interest, and Iran continues to assert its right to self-
governance as a free nation. Inevitably, if this pattern continues it will only worsen the degree of 
antithesis and no concrete change will be made.  
The final component of relationship in the C.R. SIPPABIO model is bond. The bond or 
attachment between parties within a conflict is tied to cultural meaning and social roles 
(Abdullah et al., 2016). Accordingly, the C.R. SIPPABIO model emphasizes the establishment of 
an equally understood bond. For the case of Iran and the United States this bond could be labeled 
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differently depending on who labels and determines it (e.g. enemy vs. ally). The importance 
then, is a shared understanding of what the current bond is between parties and what both parties 
expect and wish that bond to be (whether it is the same or different as the current attachment). 
The three components of relationship (power, pattern, and bond) are central to understanding the 
current conflict and play a significant role moving forward with peacemaking strategies. From an 
Islamic perspective, the way in which people operate and conceptualize relationship has dualistic 
properties. Based in the concept of tawheed as the cornerstone of Islam, Muslims engage in a 
dual dimensional relationship, relating to both the vertical and horizontal: The vertical aspect of 
this Islamic relationship refers to Muslims’ relationship with God, while the horizontal relates to 
how Muslims engage with and relation to others, in a way that recognizes others as a part of 
creation according to divine revelation (Abdullah et al., 2016). Both dimensions are valuable 
from an Islamic perspective, because building Islam in oneself involves Muslims fulfilling their 
duty to Allah and to His creation (Abdullah et al., 2016). 
 
Limitations 
Islamic models of peacemaking are extracted from and dictated in the Qur’an and Sunnah 
as divine sources (Abdullah et al., 2016). The challenges that arise are then indicative of the 
source material, and the rationalization and interpretation of abstract religious doctrine by human 
subjects. As is true with all religions, disagreement in the interpretation of religious texts and 
doctrine can lead to internal conflict and even division in religious communities (e.g. Sunnis and 
Shiites, Catholics and Protestants). As a result, the variety of interpretations can also lead to 
variation in peacemaking models. Religion and faith value are not quantifiable, so 
compartmentalizing them to be applied to a tangible, measurable model can be problematic. 
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Additionally, utilizing a conflict resolution model that is centered on religious doctrine ignores 
those involved in the conflict, who do not participate in or adhere to a particular religious belief 
system. Secular elements are also valuable to examine and include in any conflict resolution 
model, particularly when the parties involved have secular values. What is difficult for many 
religious individuals to understand is that the absence of religious faith does not always mean the 
absence of morality. The process of adapting conflict resolution tools to include an Islamic 
reality is necessary for relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. That said, a true holistic 
method of peacemaking demands a synthesis of the cultural value systems of all parties involved: 
Western and Eastern, American and Iranian, Christian and Islamic, religious and secular.   
 
 
Cross-Cultural Example of Interfaith Work in Zanzibar 
 Due to the elements of power that influence global relationships, it is of upmost 
importance to examine the role of Westerners coming into a Muslim majority region and 
engaging in interfaith peacemaking. Peter and Christy Sensenig are a Christian-American couple 
who work and live (along with their two young children) in Zanzibar, a Muslim majority 
archipelago off the coast of East Africa. Similar to the demographic break down of Iran, 
Zanzibar’s population is roughly 98% Muslim. In Zanzibar, Christy works as a healthcare 
professional under the Health Improvement Project, while Peter works at the Zanzibar Interfaith 
Center teaching intercultural relations. Living and working in Zanzibar provides the Sensenig’s 
with a rich context for interfaith and intercultural knowledge sharing and peacemaking. 
Although the group of islands is officially part of the mainland (Christian majority) 
Tanzania, Zanzibar has its own parliament and presidency, influenced by Islamic jurisprudential 
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governance [This does not mean Sharia law]. The Sensenigs address the difficulty of combining 
religion and politics, and the need to steer clear of political interference as a Westerner. “It is not 
wise for Western expats to come into a Muslim majority country and be overtly political in any 
sort of way. We don’t want to be perceived as critical of Islam in a way that closes dialogue,” 
Sensenig says. At the same time, Peter Sensenig wonders how political leaders view global 
interfaith interactions: “Surely they’re able to see the value in developing a civil society in which 
respect is [of chief importance], right? I don’t think that governments would be ambivalent about 
this sort of thing, but [rather interfaith dialogue is] something that they would want to promote.”  
Many governments and individuals who are opposed to engaging in interfaith dialogue 
adhere to the stereotypes that those participating are compromising their faith and do not take 
their faith seriously. There is a misconception that in order to have meaningful dialogue one has 
to water down their particular views and only focus on commonality, a view that is reminiscent 
of reductive pluralism. However, dictating interfaith engagement by these misconceptions 
delegitimizes dialogue and, in a sense, dehumanizes the other. The Sensenigs challenge 
Christians to consider the dangers of this ideology as a religious community: “Do we put 
anything, including our deepest-held religious convictions, above the human dignity and value of 
the people around us? Human need and human dignity trumps everything, including religion. 
Therefore it is important to recognize and address what the Sensenigs refer to as “blind spots,” or 
any convictions that hold individuals back from seeing the human dignity in others. 
According to the Sensenigs, “privilege comes with blind spots,” and Westerners can 
easily fall into the trap of the white-savior complex. The white-savior complex adheres to 
orientalist attitudes that promote Westerners as superiors who are thus able to come into foreign 
nations and act as the heroes, while the native population is portrayed as helpless and 
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consequently needing saved. Colonial ethnocentrism clearly persists into modern day 
international relations. Therefore, a dialogic approach to interfaith peacemaking requires delicate 
communication, an understanding of power dynamics, cultural sensitivity, and emotional 
intelligence among other traits. Ultimately, acting as a Westerner in this role requires respect. 
For the Sensenig’s, respect in this context means learning Swahili (the official language of 
Tanzania/Zanzibar), dressing in a culturally appropriate manner (often wearing hijab/head 
covering as a woman), and affirming cultural-religious activities (such as fasting and prayer).   
 Not only are there challenges to entering into global interfaith work as a Westerner, but 
also gaining the support to engage in such work from other Western sources. The Sensenig 
family receives financial support almost exclusively from congregations in the United States and 
individual donors. That being said, more often then not Christian organizations will allocate 
funds toward traditional evangelism, which measures its success on conversion rather than 
mutual respect and peacemaking. According to Peter Sensenig, churches and donors expect to 
hear that the opportunity to share the Gospel is taken advantage of, but that is exactly what most 
Muslims fear. Christy Sensenig argues that, “when you enter into debate it can stand in the way 
of people actually encountering Jesus.” Laughing, Peter Sensenig adds, “I don’t have any 
urgency about saving Muslims from anything. I value our Muslim friends and I like the freedom 
to see people as people, not really thinking of them in terms of what I would hope they would 
be.” In order to navigate this relationship between Western funding and traditional Western 
ideals of evangelism, the Sensenigs attempt to present the reality of their vision, which can 
challenge some Christians’ assumptions of what mission should be. The Sensenigs hope that in 
sharing knowledge of cultural context and the limitations of the traditional model of Christian 
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missionary work, Christian sponsors will find themselves wondering what it looks like to bear 
witness to faith that is centered on Jesus but is also very respectful of Muslims.  
 Although there are numerous challenges to entering into a Muslim majority region and 
engaging in interfaith dialogue as a Westerner, the process can be extremely productive with an 
open and understanding mindset. Peter Sensenig recalls attending a dialogue conference in 
Uganda hosted by Campalla University (an Islamic University in the Christian majority country). 
The main gathering including more than a thousand Muslims, Christians, religious officials, 
community leaders, and university students. During a discussion on the book, “A Muslim and A 
Christian in Dialogue” by David Shenk and Badru Kateregga, Sensenig sat beside the Iranian 
Ambassador to Uganda. At one point the Iranian Ambassador turned to Sensenig and said, “We 
need to get this book in Farsi.” Sensenig contends that it takes significant power and influence to 
make something like the translation of an interfaith dialogue book to come to fruition, especially 
in a context such as Iran where religious resources are heavily guarded. Be that as it may, many 
Iranians recognize the positive impact that interfaith engagement can have on civil society and 
international relations. Accordingly, Westerners entering into these spaces must be held 
accountable by participating in interfaith interactions with certain cultural understandings, so as 
not to inflict further damage.  
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META-COMMUNICATIVE TOUR ANALYSIS  
 The meta-communicative aspect of this research project involves a critical analysis and 
description of a learning tour in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which I participated in. The tour 
took place between April 7th and 22nd, 2018 and was sponsored by the International Institute for 
Islamic Thought and Hikmat International Institute for Oriental Wisdom and Spirituality 
(formerly the Hikmat International Institute for Religious and Cultural Studies). This analysis 
includes a broad overview of the trip itinerary as well as tour group demographics and examples 
of interfaith exchange of knowledge. The learning tour was orchestrated for the purpose of 
educating Americans and Canadians on Iranian culture and religion, with a primary focus on 
Shia Islam. For that reason much of the time in Iran was spent visiting various Shia mosques and 
shrines, historical sites, religious and educational foundations, local restaurants, traditional 
bazaars, and Iranian homes. Representatives from the Jewish community in Tehran, Armenian 
Christians in Isfahan, and Zoroastrians in Yazd were also visited and interviewed. In offering this 
meta-communicative overview readers have the opportunity to gain insight into the current 
interfaith activities taking place in the Islamic Republic of Iran and their effectiveness in 
educating foreign Westerners on different aspects of the country’s culture. Although the 
following analysis is written in a less academic and more user-friendly format, it provides a 
realistic window into the experience of participating in interfaith cultural exchange.  
 
Experiencing Iran 
 Immediately upon landing in Tehran, a message came over the intercom requesting all 
women to cover their heads in accordance with the laws of the Islamic Republic. I was in a new 
country, a new culture; this time I was the “other.” Our tour group spent sixteen days traveling 
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across Iran to six different major cities (Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and Mashhad) [See 
Figure 2.1 for a general map of our travels]. Our group consisted of five Canadians, twelve 
Americans, and our two Iranian guides Morteza and Sayyed. Roughly 80 percent of our 
American-Canadian group identified as Christian (nearly half of whom consider themselves 
Mennonite), while the remaining individuals included a Muslim woman, a male Zoroastrian 
priest, and a Jain couple. Our tour guides, of course, were both devout Shia Muslims. 
The application process for acquiring visas to the Islamic Republic of Iran was more 
intensive for the American nationals compared to our Canadian counterparts. The Canadian 
nationals taking part in the Iranian cultural tour received verification for their visa acceptances 
by early February, but we Americans were left waiting in the dark until March 28th, a week and a 
half before our scheduled departure. As a university student conducting research approved and 
supported by a state university, I had additional hoops to jump through. Luckily I was allowed to 
travel with a tourist visa rather than a student visa, a difficulty that likely would have prevented 
me from traveling to Iran altogether. Additionally, due to the fact that the Islamic Republic of 
Iran is on the US State Department travel advisory warning list under the level “do not travel,” I 
was required to sign forms stating that Kutztown University was not liable for any type of 
ransom if I were kidnapped during my travels. There were three individuals (2 American and 1 
Canadian) who’s visa requests were rejected, and therefore could not join us on the trip. As is the 
case with nearly any nation and visa processes, we were given no answer or justification for their 
rejection. Additionally one of the individuals rejected, Harry Huebner a Canadian, had traveled 
to Iran numerous times before.  
  The first site we visited on our cultural tour was one of the summer palaces of 
Mohammad Reza Shah. The palace was filled with intricate plaster carvings and walls covered in 
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cloth with bulletproof windows. The air itself was filled with a sense of decadence. After 
viewing a small fraction of the luxury enjoyed by the Pahlavi Shahs, our group drove to the 
humble residence of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The juxtaposition of these leaders’ lifestyles 
was extremely powerful to witness. Looking into the room where the Ayatollah met with 
presidents, prime ministers, and kings, we saw a single rugged couch covered with a plain white 
bed sheet. The room was nearly empty except for a couple pictures and books, compared to the 
Shah’s official dinning halls filled with rows of ornate furniture and 100 square yards of silk rugs 
hand made by 9-year-old children. Pondering these extremes, you begin to feel a humble respect 
for the Ayatollah Khomenei and the place that he holds in the hearts of the Iranian people.  
 Outside of traveling to religious and cultural sites, a significant portion of the tour was 
dedicated to formal meetings with scholars and representatives from various institutions and 
religious groups. These institutions included the Iranology Foundation & Museum, Tehran Peace 
Museum, and University of Religions and Denominations. Arguably the most noteworthy 
interview was with the Representative of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani in Qom. Before the 
meeting, our group was given a tour of the museum where al-Sistani keeps all of the priceless 
gifts he/his representative receives from the kings and government leaders he is typically in 
dialogue with. These gifts ranged from hand painted boomerangs from Australia to engraved 
swords from Saudi kings. The most precious gift, however, was a magnificent Qur’an made with 
313 Iraqi Dur-e Najaf gemstones, engraved with more than a hundred surahs (verses).  Our 
meeting with the Representative, and son-in-law, of al-Sistani lasted for several hours including 
coffee and lunch. According to our Iranian guides, ordinary people would be lucky to have only 
fifteen minutes with an Iranian cleric of this status. Contrarily, we were welcomed without 
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hesitation, went through absolutely no form of security, and left with full minds and full 
stomachs.  
Although the learning tour was centered around our formal dialoguing sessions, it was the 
cultural sharing that took place through informal dialogue that gave the truest picture of the 
Iranian people. Informal dialogue took place during many walks of our tour. Meals at local 
restaurants and strolls through luscious Persian gardens provided unique opportunities for 
interaction with everyday Iranians. It was during these chance opportunities that I began to learn 
what Iranian culture really was. You can see Iranian culture in the difference of head coverings 
between the women wearing all black chadors in Qom and the more progressive women in 
Isfahan, struggling to keep their hijabs perched ever so slightly on the backs of their heads. You 
can hear Iranian culture in the soft speech of a 7-year-old girl reciting poetry at the Shrine of 
Hafez, or the intensely mesmerizing vibrato of a man singing to his guests at a dinner party.  
Iran is more than just an Islamic Republic; it is a nation built on the great history of the 
various Persian empires. Yet, in the shadows of these historic landmarks, you can also see the 
loss of Iranian culture at the hands of Western greed. Walking through the minimalistic exhibits 
at the National Museum of Iran, you feel a sense of history missing. The gift shop sells replicas 
of the famed Cyrus cylinder, a prized Persian artifact dating back to the 6th century, which is kept 
not in the National Museum of Iran, but in the British Museum in London. I felt ashamed 
walking through museums and the mighty ruins of Persepolis, coming from a history that built 
itself on the exploitation of other great nations and people. 
 The last stop of our trip was the northern city of Mashhad, which is home to the Shrine of 
Imam Reza, the second largest shrine in the world (the first being the Ka’ba Shrine in Mecca). 
The night we arrived in Mashhad was the birthday celebration of Imam Hussein. As we walked 
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the streets people handed out candies and tea to everyone who passed. In addition to the 
magnificent cultural sights of Mashhad, this is where we had the culmination of our interfaith 
exchange. During a conference hosted by the faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies at 
Ferdowsi University, five Iranian representatives from the University faculty along with three 
American representatives from our group shared research and experience on a variety of 
interfaith topics. These topics included (but were not limited to): methodology on peaceful 
interpretations of Islam, the life example of Emir Abdulkadir, interfaith relationships between 
Muslims and Christians in the US, peacemaking courtship, and the use of water as a tool of war. 
Following the conference our group enjoyed lunch with the university faculty and had the 
opportunity to continue these discussions in a more informal setting. After our dialogue 
conference at Ferdowsi University, our group enjoyed a goodbye coffee and reception together, 
reflecting on the joys of our travels and receiving gifts of fresh Persian saffron from our gracious 
hosts. 
 
Returning Home 
 Finding your way home after a life-changing travel experience is always bittersweet. The 
sad truth about leaving Iran in April 2017 is the reality that there is no certainty of your return. 
The current relationship between the US and Iran is too unpredictable and with Trump’s 
international agenda, conditions are only getting worse. So you find yourself taking just a few 
more pictures and trying to memorize every crease in the smiling faces of your Iranian 
companions and hosts, because you do not know if you will ever see them again. But returning 
home also means sharing the true Iran with America. During our time with the Representative of 
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, he made one request of our group: “Go home and tell [America] how 
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you were treated here. How the Muslims treated you here.” I can wholeheartedly say that 
nowhere else in the world have I been shown such unadulterated hospitality as I experienced in 
Iran. Whether it was being given food and invitations for home-cooked dinners by Muslim 
women walking through the gardens of Tehran, or being showered with gifts as honored guests 
of the Zoroastrian community in Yazd, Iranian hospitality was felt by every one of our group 
during nearly every moment of our travels. For many foreigners, being an “other” in Iran is being 
treated as a guest. 
 For those who are “othered” in the US as a religious minority, returning home to the 
United States can be a harsh reminder of that reality. This is the case for my friend Awatef, who 
despite the fact that she is an American citizen and has lived in the US for decades, is treated 
differently than most Americans due to her religious identity as a Muslim. After arriving home I 
received an email from Awatef describing her experience traveling home from Iran:  
 “Landing in New York from Istanbul, I was greeted almost at the door of the airplane by a 
security officer (who was apparently waiting for me). For about 90 minutes I was asked to give 
information about my family and purpose of my visit to Iran and the places I visited. I explained 
that I was part of an interfaith group in a learning tour to learn about the history and culture of 
Iran. The agent was pleasant and courteous, however he searched my suitcases and he asked for 
my phone, which he took to another agent. I do not know if he downloaded anything. I was too 
tired to question his request. I hope that no one should be apprehended at an airport with no valid 
reason, just for having a certain faith or for coming from a certain place.”  
 
In comparison, I landed in Baltimore after flying from Vienna. Traveling with an older male 
family friend (of no blood relation), I walked into the short Mobile Passport line after finding my 
way off the plane. Stepping into place at the front of the line, the US customs officer simply 
asked me where I had traveled and what I did there. I answered that I was coming from Iran, 
where I participated in an interfaith cultural tour. He scanned my passport, stamped my forms 
and let me pass with ease. The officer called my family friend, Patrick Brady, next. All Patrick 
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told the officer was that he was traveling with me, and the officer asked no further questions; he 
scanned, stamped, and we were free to go.  
In my own experience, I now expect to be chosen for additional “random screening” 
when flying internationally, due to my flight records and having an Iranian visa in my passport. 
However, my encounters with extra security screenings pale in comparison to the relative 
interrogations awaiting Awatef. One’s religious or national identity should not preclude ethical 
treatment. Discrimination and prejudice against another’s identity is a significant breach in 
human dignity and a major cause of conflict (Abdullah et al., 2016). Although the multitudes of 
identities we hold (religious, ethnic, racial, gender, etc.) specifically shape our sense of self, it is 
our shared human identity that should dictate our interactions with others. The following Persian 
poem by the famous Shirazi Sa’adi (1210-91) exemplifies the salience of a shared human 
identity: 
Human beings are members of one another 
All created from the same precious jewel. 
When, in the course of life, 
Pain comes to a member, 
The other members cannot remain at peace. 
When you do not grieve at the suffering of others 
You cannot be called by the name “human.” 
 
This poem is not only on the tongues of nearly every Iranian, but also inscribed above the 
entryway to the United Nations building in New York City (Shellenberger, 2013). No American 
should be interrogated at the airport due to their particular religious identity, and no Iranian 
should be kept from traveling to the United States because of where they were born.  
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CONCLUSION 
This study provides a Muslim-centric approach to interfaith dialogue, in order to 
emphasize a sense of cross-cultural understanding to a primarily Western-Christian audience. 
Collaborative efforts from Iranian locals and Mennonite communities in the United States and 
Canada have opened up the opportunity for religious peacemaking for both inter- and intra-state 
purposes. Documenting the unique relations of interfaith dialogue within the Islamic Republic of 
Iran can inform innovative peacemaking strategies to religious conflicts and anti-Muslim 
sentiment in the United States and abroad. Additionally, this research has the potential to not 
only innovate, but also reestablish diplomatic ties between the United States and Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The significance associated with understanding the perspective of the ‘other’ is 
paramount for the success of any social relationship, including those within the sphere of 
international diplomacy. 
The American image-framing of Iranians and Muslims as the stranger, a demonized other 
rooted in ethnocentric orientalist attitudes, has a continual negative impact on international 
diplomacy and domestic affairs. The underlying assumptions plaguing Islam as a religion of 
radicalism and violence is often based in hypocrisy and ignores a holistic view of religion and 
how religion manifests in society. By incorporating Iranian Shia Muslim perspectives on topics 
of peace, interfaith engagement, and religion’s intersection with politics, this study provides an 
example of fresh cross-cultural communication and understanding. Additionally, the inclusion of 
a relational peacebuilding model (C.R.SIPPABIO) grounded in Islamic principles and values sets 
the tone for mutual respect and collaborative peacemaking. That being said, an 
acknowledgement of the power dynamics involved with such conflicts is also essential to the 
realistic development of positive change between the US and Iran. The complex role of 
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Westerners entering into foreign nations with unfamiliar socio-religious practices is riddled with 
colonial undertones. For this reason, examples of Christian-Americans entering into these roles 
in a respectful and culturally sensitive manner must be highlighted. Lastly, an appreciation of 
small successes in cultural exchange and interfaith knowledge sharing support the 
comprehension of change as a process, requiring constructive effort from political leaders, 
researchers, NGO’s, and ordinary citizens alike.  
When it comes to the current debate, scholars and politicians question how much religion 
should be incorporated into politics and why dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
necessary. The inherently antagonistic stance of closing oneself off and refusing to speak with 
another is what requires justification; dialogue is its own justification (Huebner, 2016). 
Furthermore, politicians often fail to acknowledge the socio-cultural importance of religion and 
its intersection with the political sphere. Therefore a basic understanding of religious literacy as 
stated in the cultural studies approach is absolutely necessary when engaging in diplomacy with 
a religious state, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. Progressive Mennonite communities (often 
associated with Mennonite Central Committee) arguably have the greatest potential to foster 
peaceful dialogue with Iran, based on their current and past relational exchanges, as well as their 
shared philosophical/spiritual framework. Given the current evolution of the American political 
stance toward the Islamic Republic of Iran and the widening of intolerance, conducting research, 
heightening advocacy, and the development and implementation of concrete steps toward peace 
are extremely valuable and relevant.  
Further research on this topic should include continual analyses of current interfaith 
activity with the Islamic Republic of Iran both within and without government intervention. 
Although there are few sources of this information between the US and Iran, analyses of more 
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positive relations between Iran and European nations (such as Germany) could be extremely 
insightful moving forward. Unfortunately, Western news sources and accounts detailing past and 
current conditions in Iran relating to democracy and attitudes toward America are often 
unreliable and misconstrued. Therefore, journalists and researchers alike have a responsibility 
not only to cite accurate sources, but also to conduct ethical and veracious primary research. 
When truth is swept under the rug, radicalism overrides ethics, and ethnocentrism dictates 
diplomacy, the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran both suffer. Individuals and leaders of 
both nations owe it to themselves, to the other, and to the world to foster mutual respect and 
harmony. Currently, interfaith dialogue provides an avenue for that very sentiment. If one nation 
is reaching out their hand in a gesture of peace, human dignity dictates the need to take it.  
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APPENDIX  
Figures 
1.1 
Timeline of Important Dates in Iran-US History 
 
 
 
 
1953: Western (US & UK) overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mosaddegh 
 
1979 (Jan.): Shah flees to US seeking medical treatment and is welcome by 
President Jimmy Carter 
1979 (Feb.): Ayatollah Khomenei returns to Iran at the success of the Islamic 
Revolution 
1979 (Nov.): Student radicals take control of the US embassy 
  
 
 
1980: Start of the Iran-Iraq War 
1981: US embassy hostages are released 
1988 (July): US shoots down Iranian civilian airliner, killing 290 passengers 
and crew 
1988 (Aug.): Iran-Iraq War ends with UN brokered ceasefire 
  
 
 
2002: President Bush's State of the Union "axis of evil" speech 
 
 
2015: The Iran Nuclear Deal is arranged between the P5+1 (US, UK, China, 
Russia, France, and Germany) and Iran 
2018: President Trump backs out of the Iran Deal and imposes more 
sanctions on Iran 
 
1980 
1970 
1950 
2000 
2010 
1960 
1990 
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2.1 
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3.1 
Map of Travel Across Iran 
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Photos 
 
 
 
Photographed by: Sayed Ruhollah Rastitubar      Tehran 
 
Group photo of our American-Canadian tour group and guide Morteza (far right) 
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer        Tehran 
 
Golestan Palace, the former royal complex of the Qajar Dynasty  
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer        Tehran 
 
View of Tehran skyline from the Milad Tower  
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer        Tehran 
 
Iranian women enjoying a picnic at the Garden of Tulips  
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer 
 
Tehran street with signs/photos of Ayatollah Khamenei (left) and Ayatollah Khomeini (right) 
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                 Photographed by: Calvin Friesen     Yazd  
 
                 Our wonderful tour guides/friends, Sayed (left) and Morteza (right) 
 78 
Photographed by: Calvin Friesen    Shiraz 
 
Morteza with his son Ali at the Shrine of Hafez 
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer        Qom 
 
Tomb of unknown Iranian soldiers from the Iran-Iraq War. A sign outside the tomb reads, “The 
Blessed Resting Place of 14 Anonymous Martyrs Who Gave Their Lives for Islam in the Holy 8 
Year Defense (1980-1988) Against Saddam’s Tyrant Regime, And the Arrogant Superpowers 
Supporting It.” 
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer                 Tehran 
 
Meeting with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour (center). Ed Martin 
sits next to him (left).  
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Photographed by: Calvin Friesen        Qom 
 
Meeting with Ayatollah Alavi Boroujerdi (far right) at the Shrine of Lady Fatima Ma’sumeh 
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer        Qom 
 
Ceiling at the Shrine of Fatima Ma’sumeh 
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer            Qom 
 
A painting of Ayatollah al-Sistani (right) and a photograph of his Representative/son-in-law 
(left) above a showcase of gifts in al-Sistani’s Museum. 
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Photographed by: Calvin Friesen              Qom 
 
Morteza (left) next to the Representative of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani (right) in religious attire.  
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer                 Isfahan 
 
Outside view of the Masjed-e Jadid-e Abbasi or Shah Mosque in Imam Square. 
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer                 Isfahan 
 
Inside the Shah Mosque  
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Photographed by: John & Kathryn Fairfield            Mashhad 
 
Shrine of Imam Reza on the evening of Imam Hussein’s birthday celebration 
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer        Shiraz 
 
Interior of the Nasir-ol-molk Mosque or the Pink Mosque 
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Photographed by: Calvin Friesen        Shiraz 
 
Me kneeling next to Ali in the courtyard of the Pink Mosque  
 
 
